Saturday, November 13, 2004

Restructuring the Canadian Armed Forces

The Canadian Armed Forces is in dire straits.

With a reported shortfall of $500 million, increased deployments and an indifferent government, some drastic decisions must be made.

First, and foremost, the government in Ottawa must stop the double standard of treating the military as yet another government department while sticking its nose into every little aspect of the CF. It is mind boggling that $100 million can disappear in the sponsorship scandal, Human Resources Development Canada can blow $1 Billion and the Federal Gun Registry is allowed to balloon from a couple of million dollars to a projected cost of $2 billion, yet the moment Paul Martin became Prime Minister he froze the program to replace 25 year old armoured vehicles with new ones made in London, Ontario and then acted like he was so wonderful for resuming what was allready in place.

The military is a unique entity and must be allowed to operate as such. It must be allowed to use its budget on the priorities determined by National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ), not by parliament. By necessity, the military must work on extended timelines, as capital procurement takes years, where as politicians only seem to look as far as the next election. These two visions do not mesh nor should either side expect them to.

Unfortunately, even if the military where given discretionary use of its budget, it will do little good without a total revamping of the military hierarchy.

In the past, whenever NDHQ has been forced to make reductions due to spending constraints, the cuts have come from the bottom, leaving the military top heavy. Even under the direction of the Minister of National Defence, NDHQ has continued to play with the numbers to keep the compliment of Flag Officers fairly steady.

The current structure does not reflect the realities of the modern world. Since World War II, the army and navy have carried out the majority of deployments. Even now it is army units in Afghanistan, and naval units in the Arabian Gulf. Yet, the Armed Forces Council, whose job it is to advise the Chief of Defence Staff, has only two army members out of eight people.
It is obvious that a major restructuring is long overdue.

An independent review of the CF command structure should be immediately convened. It should include military experts from all fields as well as representatives of all ranks in the CF. In order to give a semblance of impartiality, it must not contain serving members or anyone currently serving in parliament. And the recommendations must be implemented.

The current financial state of the CF also calls for radical cuts in personnel. With prevailing foreign policy leaning toward ever-increasing commitments to peacemaking, as opposed to peacekeeping, proper equipment also becomes essential. There is the vital replacement of ageing equipment to consider as well. 25 year old Combat Support Vehicles, trucks that are rusting away, replenishment ships sitting idle waiting for replacements, 40 year old helicopters, and destroyers needing either replacement or refit, these all add to the cost of running the military.

There are areas that could be cut that would save millions, if not billions, of dollars. We need to remove the Air Force, Search and Rescue and the Naval Reserve, from the military structure.
There are currently 118 CF18 Hornets in the CF. During the last 15 years we have seen 24 of them deployed during the first Gulf War and 18 sent to participate in the NATO air campaign in the former Yugoslavia. Yet we keep these expensive to run and maintain pieces of equipment. The argument is that they are used to establish sovereignty of our airspace but the reality is that the only threat to our sovereignty at this moment is the United States and 118 planes will not make a difference. We have depended on the US for defence for decades, why not make it official?

Of the 6 Challenger jets, the 4 VIP jets should be transferred to the Transportation Ministry since that is what they do. Let another branch of the government bear the cost of these expensive taxis.

Aircraft that are primarily used by the army should be transferred over to it. The CC130 Hercules transport and the CH146 Griffon helicopter are used principally in support of army operations and should be under army control. The Seakings, and their eventual replacement, should likewise be placed under naval command.

Search and Rescue responsibilities and equipment should be transferred to the Coast Guard, as should the Naval Reserve. Interdepartmental co-operation would make this a beneficial arrangement with the Coast Guard gaining the enhanced capabilities of relatively new Coastal Defence Vessels and the Naval Reserve being given more sea time. Future collaborations on equipment would also ensure new equipment meets Coast Guard needs while ensuring a training platform for the navy.

Maritime patrol aircraft, like the 18 CP140 Aurora’s, would also come under Coast Guard control while the four CC138 Twin Otters would be transferred to the army to continue to support northern operations. The elimination of the CF18’s would negate the need for two of our five CC150 Polaris/Airbus’ to be converted to air-to-air refuellers and all could be transferred to the Ministry of Transport to be used as needed to ferry government or military personnel.

The CF needs innovative solutions to the current crisis our armed forces are facing. We need people who think "outside the box" because inside the box is the past and it is the future we need to be concentrating on.


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